How Meta’s Muse AI Agent Reached Signal Messages Without Breaking Encryption

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Meta Muse Signal Access

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A Meta employee asked Muse about tides. Reuters then showed what the agent could read on Android and Mac, and why the permission model failed to stop it.

A Meta employee was chatting with Muse about tides. It was the kind of low-stakes, recurring exchange that makes a personal agent feel useful: weather for fishing, the state of the water, nothing involving money. Then the assistant added a line nobody had asked for: “BTW, two bank updates, your Capital One balance is $2722.58, your Charles Schwab balance is $5899.57.”

The employee’s reaction, in an internal post reviewed by Reuters, was fear. “I have never shared my bank account with Muse and never discussed any banking topic with Muse. I’m afraid it’s sending other’s bank info to me.”

Around the same time, another employee running Muse on her personal phone got a reminder to reply to her sister on Signal, an end-to-end encrypted messenger she had never connected to the agent. “This seems like an extreme privacy violation,” she wrote. “I definitely did not grant it access to other apps, or recall being asked about this.” A colleague then noted that Muse was set up by default with permission to read push notifications on Android.

Meta Muse Logo
Meta Muse Logo

What Reuters found when it tested Muse on Android, Mac, and iPhone

The internal posts were anecdotes. Reuters, working with staff at Signal and the AI Now Institute, tried to reproduce the behavior on purpose across platforms and published the results on 18 November 2026.

  • On Android, Muse retrieved Signal message text through its notification-access permission.
  • On macOS, it used a combination of accessibility and screenshot capabilities.
  • On iPhone, the same requests were blocked.

In every case Muse bypassed Meta’s own “Connector” integration layer and relied on operating-system permissions granted during initial setup.

None of this broke Signal’s cryptography. The test showed that the boundary users think they are drawing (“these apps are connected to my agent, those are not”) differs from the one the operating system enforces. Two systems of authority are involved. They are granted at different times, through different interfaces, and revoked in different places, and neither knows the other exists. That gap matters far more than whether one chatbot said something odd about a bank account.

What is confirmed and what is not

The two strands of the Reuters reporting have very different strengths, and coverage has often blended them.

The Signal access is reproduced. Reuters, Signal staff, and AI Now tested it on three platforms and got consistent, platform-dependent results. Meta spokesperson Daniel Roberts called the reported examples “isolated incidents” and said Muse can reach other apps only through permissions users explicitly grant. Read carefully, that statement fits the finding instead of denying it. The permissions were granted, and the dispute is over what granting them means.

The bank balances are not established. Reuters says it could not determine whether Muse was surfacing other people’s financial data or making it up. Meta attributes many of the flagged messages to hallucination and says those problems were addressed. Roberts declined to tell Reuters how many such incidents there were or why they persisted.

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Meta’s hallucination explanation has an engineering account behind it. In September, David Singleton, an engineering vice president at Meta Superintelligence Labs, explained that a product update had added instructions telling Muse how to engage users and ask for confirmation before certain actions. Those instructions “landed on every message, not just messages pertaining to those specific actions, so its impact was wider than intended,” and were delivered “in a way that the model was not expecting (i.e. was not trained to expect).” He called it a bug that caused hallucination, not a security or privacy issue, and said it was fixed.

Internally, according to Reuters, a team member told the employee feedback group in early November that the agent appeared to be hallucinating in response to built-in prompts pushing it to engage users between sessions. These hallucinations “unfortunately bias towards the most uncomfortable topics, like finances/security/safety, which sucks.” He mentioned cryptocurrency variants, including unsolicited Bitcoin balance updates.

Several details cut against a quick fix. Reuters found internal posts describing this behavior from mid-September through November, a longer window than a same-day fix implies. Other reported incidents cost real money: a non-refundable Airbnb booking made without authorization, invented prices on real purchases, and, per Ars Technica, a staffer whose dog “accidentally rolled me into a premium insurance plan” at $888 a month instead of $200, with the difference unrecoverable.

These are two independent failure modes, and the public debate keeps treating them as alternatives. An agent that can read notification text from apps you never connected has an over-broad input surface. An agent that invents plausible financial figures has an under-constrained generative tendency. Fixing the second does nothing for the first, and the Signal reproduction stands however the bank-balance question resolves.

How Android’s notification listener exposes message content

The Android mechanism is neither obscure nor a vulnerability. NotificationListenerService has existed since Android 4.3 in 2013 (API level 18). An app declares a service in its manifest guarded by android.permission.BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE, and the user enables it on a dedicated system settings page. That flow is deliberately heavier than a runtime permission dialog: a manual toggle, then a confirmation dialog explaining the implications. Google told Reuters that users “must deliberately grant permissions” for notification access, which is accurate about the interface.

What the interface authorizes is broader than the name suggests. Once bound, the listener receives onNotificationPosted(StatusBarNotification, RankingMap) for every notification from every app on the device. The StatusBarNotification carries the originating package name and the full Notification object, including its extras bundle with title and text. For conversation-style notifications built with Notification.MessagingStyle, it includes the message payloads themselves. That is the actual content delivered as structured data, with no OCR and no pixels involved.

The retroactive capability matters as much as the live stream. getActiveNotifications() returns notifications currently outstanding, so a listener that binds today can read the backlog that built up before it existed. getSnoozedNotifications() extends that to snoozed items. A listener can also act. cancelNotification(key) dismisses other apps’ notifications, and by pulling a notification’s contentIntent or an action’s actionIntent and calling send() (constructing a RemoteInput first if the action takes text), it can trigger what a user tap would, including quick-reply.

The abuse surface is well documented. The ISSTA 2025 paper Walls Have Ears: Demystifying Notification Listener Usage in Android Apps built a static taint-analysis system called NLRadar and applied it to both malware and store-distributed apps. Its findings:

  • 21.07% of the malicious apps and 2.88% of the regular apps transmitted notification title and text to the network.
  • 52.2% of the malicious apps dismissed notifications, a pattern consistent with covering tracks. So did 13.6% of regular apps, mostly tools and cleaners.
  • 119 regular apps triggered notification buttons with customized input, which amounts to auto-reply.
  • Some malware filtered for WhatsApp notifications, replied to the victim’s contacts with malicious URLs through quick-reply, then cancelled the notification so the user never saw it.
  • Across 3,317 tracked apps, 242 added the notification-listener permission in a later release, 216 began leaking notification data in a later release, and 72 escalated from local storage to network upload. Of twenty apps sampled with that escalation, only four disclosed notification access in their current privacy policies.

Two details of the API explain why the user’s mental model and the system diverge. First, the filtering controls belong to the listener, not to the app being read. A listener declares META_DATA_DEFAULT_FILTER_TYPES and META_DATA_DISABLED_FILTER_TYPES in its own manifest, and migrateNotificationFilter(defaultTypes, disallowedPkgs) lets it tell the OS which packages it does not want. Signal has no matching lever, so the app whose messages are being read cannot decline. Second, Android’s per-app “hide sensitive content on lock screen” setting is a rendering policy, not an access control. It governs what SystemUI draws on a secure lock screen, using the notification’s publicVersion where one exists, and the listener still receives the object.

Google has narrowed this surface once. Android 15 introduced OTP redaction: the system stops untrusted notification listeners from reading unredacted content of notifications where a one-time passcode was detected, with trusted apps such as companion-device-manager associations exempt. This is a shipped, content-class-scoped restriction of the kind Meredith Whittaker is asking for, applied to one category of secret. Android 15 also added screenshare protections that hide notification content during projection, honor setPublicVersion(), and let developers mark regions of their UI as sensitive with setContentSensitivity(). So the platform already knows how to redact by content class and let developers declare sensitivity. Neither capability extends to “this application is off-limits to agents.”

One more assumption worth correcting: FLAG_SECURE, the window flag that keeps an activity out of screenshots and the recents thumbnail, does nothing here. It protects a rendering surface. A notification listener never touches that surface. It receives a Binder-delivered data structure from the system server.

How macOS accessibility, screen capture, and Full Disk Access reach other apps

The Mac pathway Reuters reproduced combines accessibility and screen capture. Both predate AI agents by years.

macOS exposes assistive technology through the AXUIElement family in Application Services. A process with the Accessibility grant can call AXUIElementCreateApplication(pid) to get a handle on another app’s UI, then walk it with AXUIElementCopyAttributeValue using attributes such as kAXChildrenAttribute and kAXValueAttribute. The result is a structured tree of every label, text field, row, and value the target app exposes. For a messaging client, that means the rendered conversation as text, with no image processing. Where the hierarchy is uncooperative (SwiftUI hosting views and Electron apps often produce trees that don’t match the visible layout), AXUIElementCreateSystemWide() plus AXUIElementCopyElementAtPosition() lets a caller hit-test a screen coordinate and climb back to a container. MacPaw’s research team documented this technique, including the hit-test workaround, and noted that Appium and XCUITest are built on the same subsystem. It is the API working as designed, and it is what makes VoiceOver work.

Screen capture is the second capability. It was historically gated by the Screen Recording entry in the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework, with CGWindowListCreateImage deprecated in favor of ScreenCaptureKit. Since macOS 15 Sequoia, Apple has required periodic re-authorization for screen-recording grants, monthly instead of the weekly cadence floated in early betas. That was an early admission that a consent given once and kept forever suits a capability this broad poorly.

The key property of classic TCC is the direction of the grant. It records that a requesting app may use a capability. It does not record which target apps the requester may look at. An agent holding Accessibility and screen capture can in principle observe any window it can reach, which is how “I never connected Signal” and “the agent read Signal” can both be true.

Signal’s own position on macOS sharpens this. In May 2025 the project shipped a Screen security setting for Signal Desktop on Windows 11, on by default, to defeat Microsoft Recall. It works through a DRM flag on the application window, which Microsoft’s documentation says keeps content out of “Recall or any other screenshot application.” Signal said plainly that this was a workaround forced by the lack of proper developer controls, that it breaks some screen readers and magnification tools, and that the setting is local and does not extend to macOS or Linux. The platform where the Reuters Mac test succeeded has no equivalent shield.

There is also a third macOS path, separate from the one Reuters tested, which coverage has muddled. In September, Inc. columnist Jason Aten reported that Muse had synced his Mac’s Messages database, roughly 187,000 rows, after he declined Messages access and, he said, never enabled Full Disk Access. Singleton replied that “your Muse can only read Messages content if macOS system-level Full Disk Access is granted and the Messages connector is enabled.” Aten answered that Full Disk Access was off and the sync happened anyway. Security researcher Patrick Wardle told Ars Technica the connector condition is not a technical constraint: “From a technical point of view, with FDA (full-disk access), any (non-root file), is readable, browsing history, browser cookies, chats, etc etc etc.” He is right about the primitive. Full Disk Access is a filesystem grant, while a connector toggle is a policy inside the vendor’s own software that the kernel does not enforce.

The same logic applies to Signal Desktop. It stores history in a SQLCipher database at ~/Library/Application Support/Signal/sql/db.sqlite. The 256-bit key sits wrapped in config.json as encryptedKey, and the wrapping key comes from Electron’s safeStorage, which on macOS derives from a login-keychain item named “Signal Safe Storage.” The chain runs keychain, then safeStorage key, then SQLCipher key, then database, and code running as the logged-in user can unlock every link. At-rest encryption protects the database when the machine is off, not from anyone who is already you. Full Disk Access plus a keychain prompt is a short step from a plaintext SQL table of every message the desktop client has displayed.

This is not a Signal flaw. It is the standard end-to-end encryption threat model: the wire is protected and the endpoints are trusted. What is new about consumer agents is that users install them on the endpoint, with their own authority, and let them read whatever the user can read.

Why the iPhone test was blocked

The iPhone result reflects platform design, not better behavior from Meta on iOS. iOS has no public API for one third-party app to read another’s notifications, and a notification service extension can only process remote notifications addressed to its own app. Third parties have no cross-app accessibility inspection API, and app containers are sandboxed. Cross-app screen capture requires an explicit, user-initiated ReplayKit broadcast. The capabilities the agent used on Android and macOS are simply not user-grantable on iOS. Same agent, same instruction, different reachable surface.

Meta’s Muse sandbox protects the cloud VM, not the device

Muse is not carelessly contained. Meta’s launch engineering post is one of the more detailed public documents any consumer agent vendor has produced.

Each user gets a dedicated cloud Linux VM. Inside it, the agent harness (codenamed Hatch) and the user’s workspace run in a systemd-nspawn container where root maps to an unprivileged host user, with its own root filesystem, a virtual network interface, filtered syscalls (io_uring excluded), and dropped capabilities including CAP_SYS_PTRACE and CAP_NET_ADMIN. Security-sensitive services run outside that cell as separate systemd units:

  • hatch-safety runs independent classifiers over inference traffic, so an attacker inside the cell cannot switch them off.
  • Privsep workers execute built-in connector logic with tightly scoped privileges.
  • hatch-authd holds credentials and performs surrogation.
  • A Postgres database keeps durable state outside both the cell and the credential store.

Interprocess communication uses Unix domain sockets with SO_PEERCRED and peer ACLs, so identity is kernel-authenticated and no secrets travel in the channel.

Sentinel is the sole permission authority for connector actions and network egress. The agent proposes, and Sentinel decides: allow, deny, or ask. Egress passes through a forward proxy enforced with user namespaces, veth boundaries, and eBPF filtering. Sentinel inspects at both layer 4 and layer 7, covering hostname, resolved and final destination IP, port, protocol, HTTP method, path, and the decoded request, with SSRF restrictions to stop a public hostname resolving to private infrastructure after DNS lookup. Credentials never enter the cell. Code sees only a surrogate token minted by authd, and Sentinel swaps in the real secret at the network boundary after authorization. Tricking the model into revealing an API key yields a token with no rights.

The taint mechanism is the piece that matters most here. Meta calls it “tainted egress.” Each tool process starts clean and becomes tainted if it reads user data. Clean requests inside a narrow auto-allow policy pass without bothering the user, while tainted or unverifiable processes lose auto-allow and fall back to approval. It uses eBPF cgroup programs for network interception and process attribution, plus eBPF programs on Linux Security Module hooks that Meta added for taint propagation. Approvals appear in the client UI, outside the conversation, so the model cannot fake or intercept them. They are strict capabilities bound to a connector, destination, and use case, with one-time, session, task, time-bounded, or perpetual scope.

Other safeguards follow the same discipline:

  • The email connector strips one-time passcodes, password-reset links, and magic links using deterministic filters plus a classifier, because an inbox is a skeleton key to every other account.
  • The browser sub-agent receives an accessibility-tree snapshot of the page instead of the raw DOM, cannot run JavaScript in page context, and pauses entirely while the user takes over or credentials are being filled.
  • Checkout pages trigger mandatory human approval every time, and payments through the Stripe Link partnership use single-use card numbers bound to a merchant, an amount, and a short validity window.
  • The bug bounty pays up to $300,000, including up to $130,000 for a prompt injection affecting a single user.
  • A Confidential VM mode, built with input from Signal creator Moxie Marlinspike, is meant to cryptographically prevent Meta itself from reading VM contents.

Set that architecture against the Reuters finding and the mismatch is exact. Every enforcement mechanism sits inside the cloud VM and concerns what leaves it. The notification listener runs in the Muse client on the phone. The accessibility and screen-capture calls run in the Muse client on the Mac. Those reads happen on hardware the VM’s eBPF programs cannot see, under grants Sentinel did not issue and cannot revoke. The text then reaches the VM over the client’s secure transport as ordinary user context, which the system treats as legitimately acquired private data. Taint tracking will mark any process that touches it and demand approval before it goes back out. It never asks whether the data should have come in.

This is an ingress problem handled with an egress solution. Taint tracking answers “may this process send data it has touched to that destination?” It cannot answer “was this process entitled to touch that data at all?” because that answer lives in a permission system owned by Google and Apple, exercised during onboarding, on a different machine.

Lifetimes differ too. A Sentinel approval is scoped, typed, and revocable inside the product. An Android notification-access grant or a macOS TCC grant lasts effectively forever until the user finds the right settings pane. That gives two authority systems, two revocation surfaces, two audit trails, and no shared ledger. Meta’s email connector shows the company understands content-class filtering well, since it wrote deterministic filters and a classifier to keep password-reset links away from the model. It applied that instinct to connectors and not to the much wider pipe that OS permissions open.

Apple’s macOS 27.3 permission changes and what they leave open

Apple moved twice. In October it announced changes to Full Disk Access, saying some developers were using it “in ways that could put users at risk, exposing everything on their systems—including files, mail, messages, and even browsing history—without users’ full knowledge and understanding,” and that as agents become more capable and autonomous the risks “will grow substantially.”

On 16 November, in macOS 27.3 beta 2, it shipped the substance. The developer notice describes changes to two APIs: Device Control and Data Access, and Full Disk Access. In macOS 27.2, Device Control and Data Access was one toggle whose own description warned that an app holding it could view and send email, edit contacts and photos, monitor the keyboard, track websites, record the screen, and control any app on the Mac. It is now split into Accessibility, meant for assistive technologies, and System & App Protection Override, a new category for software that needs to bypass macOS protections to control other apps or automate tasks.

The scoping is what counts. Under System & App Protection Override, users can specify which apps an automation tool may reach: Mail but not Messages, in 9to5Mac’s example. Full Disk Access can be narrowed to specific folders, and users can set an app to ask every time instead of holding a standing grant. A menu bar indicator shows whenever an app is controlling another app under the override. Developers of backup tools and genuine assistive technologies can request entitlements that preserve the pre-27.3 experience for new installations, and Apple says known apps are unaffected without one. The underlying APIs do not change, so developers must handle the case where a user grants partial access.

As far as I can tell, this is the first time a major desktop OS has drawn an agent-shaped permission category and made cross-app reach per-target instead of global. It closes the pathway Reuters identified for new grants, and Reuters described it that way.

Two limits deserve equal weight. First, Apple’s notice says all permissions users previously granted remain in effect, and the new flow appears only when they approve new requests. Anyone who gave an agent broad access during onboarding keeps it under the old terms until they narrow it by hand in the settings pane. A fix that protects the next installation better than the current one is a familiar pattern in platform permissions, and it is not a scandal. Second, the notice covers Device Control and Data Access and Full Disk Access. It does not describe a matching re-scoping of the separate screen-recording grant, and it creates nothing an application can declare on its own behalf. An app that wants to say “no agent may read my content” still has no API to say it.

Google, shown the same findings, said it was considering changes and repeated that notification access must be deliberately granted. No Android equivalent of the macOS split has been announced. The notification-listener model remains a broad, user-grantable capability designed when its consumers were smartwatch bridges, notification managers, and accessibility helpers, software that displayed or filtered text and did not reason over it or act on it.

What Signal’s Meredith Whittaker wants from OS vendors and AI companies

Signal president Meredith Whittaker told Reuters that Meta launched Muse “without showing any respect for basic privacy or cybersecurity,” and called deploying agents with wide device access “technologically reckless.” That quote is easy to dismiss as positioning, but the proposal underneath is specific: app developers should have “consistent technical ways” to mark their apps as off-limits to AI agents, AI companies should honor those boundaries, and operating system providers should enforce them.

Signal Logo
Signal Logo

That would add a layer to the permission stack, and Signal made essentially the same argument eighteen months earlier about a different product. Its May 2025 Recall post warned that “the integration of AI agents with pervasive permissions, questionable security hygiene, and an insatiable hunger for data has the potential to break the blood-brain barrier between applications and operating systems.” It asked OS vendors shipping agents to ensure privacy-preserving apps “always have the necessary tools and options at their disposal to reject granting OS-level AI systems access to any sensitive information within their apps.” The Windows DRM flag was, in Signal’s words, “one weird trick,” adopted because the proper tools did not exist.

Pieces of such a mechanism already ship. Android redacts OTPs from untrusted listeners and lets developers mark UI regions sensitive during screenshare. FLAG_SECURE keeps pixels out of capture. Windows honors a DRM window flag against Recall. macOS 27.3 lets a user scope which apps an automation tool may control. Each one is threat-specific, user-driven, or a repurposed content-protection feature. None is a general, app-declared, OS-enforced statement that an app’s content is unavailable to general-purpose agents.

Building one is hard, and the design problems are real:

  • It has to be enforced below the agent vendor, because a policy that depends on Meta behaving well is not a boundary.
  • It has to cover four separate observation paths (notification payloads, accessibility trees, screen capture, and filesystem reads), since blocking three leaves the fourth.
  • It has to work for genuine assistive technology. Signal flagged this trade-off itself when it enabled the Windows flag: a screen reader user and an agent come through the same door, and a naive block hurts the person who needs access.
  • It has to admit that a determined agent with Full Disk Access and an unlocked keychain can still read the database, because no permission model fixes an endpoint that has already been handed over.

What builders and users should do about AI agent permissions

The consumer-agent category has put heavy effort into securing the agent’s own runtime and very little into reconciling that runtime with the operating system’s permission semantics. Sandboxing, taint tracking, credential surrogation, scoped approvals, and connector policy are real engineering, and Meta’s version is above the category median. All of it sits downstream of a decision made earlier: what the client app on your phone or laptop may read before any of that machinery sees a byte.

For anyone building or deploying these systems, three points follow:

  1. Treat notification access as read access to every messaging app on the device, because that is what it is. An agent that holds it should apply the same connector-level policy to the resulting text as it would to an explicitly integrated app.
  2. Treat accessibility and screen capture as general-purpose observation, not as an integration with whichever window happens to be open. macOS 27.3’s per-target scoping is the right primitive, even with its retroactive gap.
  3. Make the connector list shown to users a truthful description of the agent’s reachable input surface. If an OS grant can reach an app the list omits, the list misleads in the way that matters.

For users, the mitigations are plain and effective:

  • On Android, check which apps hold notification access under special app access in settings, and revoke it from anything that does not need to display or manage your alerts.
  • On a Mac, review Accessibility, Screen Recording, and Full Disk Access under Privacy & Security. After updating to macOS 27.3, remember that your old grants carry over untouched.
  • In Signal, set Settings → Notifications → Show to “No name or message” on Android or “No Name or Content” on iOS. A notification listener then receives nothing worth reading, at the cost of previews and quick replies.

Meta has reasons to keep the surface wide. Muse launched on 8 September 2026, has passed ten million downloads, sits at the center of Meta’s AI revenue plans, and was promoted across a base of more than 3.6 billion people on Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp. The company has disclosed that roughly a quarter of people who set up an account return daily. Reuters notes that Mark Zuckerberg has cited Muse’s isolation protections while dismissing calls for industry-wide AI safety standards, arguing that companies already have enough incentive, in consumer trust and legal exposure, to build safe products. Meta also warns that Muse makes mistakes, and its terms hold users responsible for the agent’s actions. Those three positions sit awkwardly together.

Bottom line: the permission, not the encryption, was the weak point

Signal’s protocol did its job. The message was encrypted in transit, decrypted only at the endpoint, and never exposed on the wire. The agent lives at the endpoint. It did not need to break a cipher, only to be present when plaintext appeared, and a permission granted during onboarding, under a description that did not convey its reach, put it there. No amount of kernel-level taint tracking in a cloud VM can repair a boundary drawn in the wrong place on the device in your hand.

FAQs

  1. Did Meta’s Muse break Signal’s encryption? No. It read message text on the device after Signal had decrypted it, using OS permissions the user granted during setup.
  2. Which platforms did Reuters test? Android, macOS, and iPhone. Signal text was retrieved on Android and macOS, and the same requests were blocked on iPhone.
  3. How do I stop an app reading my Android notifications? Revoke notification access under special app access in settings, and set Signal’s notification content to “No name or message.”
  4. Does macOS 27.3 fix this? It adds per-app scoping for automation tools for new grants, but permissions already granted stay in effect.

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