On 18 November 2026, the ransomware-as-a-service group The Gentlemen added NVIDIA to its dark web leak site. The listing shows the company’s revenue figures and its NVDA stock ticker, says data is coming “SOON”, and gives a Tox ID for negotiation. That is everything it shows. There are no sample files and no inventory of what was supposedly taken, and NVIDIA has not confirmed a breach. Leak-site trackers logged the entry on the morning of 18 November, and as of writing I have found no statement from NVIDIA and no independent forensic analysis.
A leak-site entry is a pressure tool in a double-extortion playbook, so I am treating this as an unverified claim until samples or a company statement appear. The group behind it deserves a close look either way, because its tradecraft is what enterprise defenders face no matter who is on the list.
What the NVIDIA listing shows
The entry names NVIDIA, attaches financial metrics and the stock ticker, and points to a Tox ID where the victim is invited to negotiate. The “SOON” label sits where a data inventory would normally go. Ransomware crews use that placeholder to push a victim into talks before it has had time to work out what, if anything, was taken.
Until samples are published, the claim cannot be tied to any specific system, dataset, or time window. A company of NVIDIA’s size and profile makes a strong headline, which is part of why such listings get posted early.

Who is The Gentlemen ransomware group?
Microsoft tracks the group as Storm-2697, and Sophos tracks it as GOLD SHERWOOD. It emerged in mid-2025 and moved to a full RaaS model by September of that year. Affiliates keep 90 percent of each ransom payment, a split that explains much of its growth.
By mid-2026 the group had claimed hundreds of victims in more than sixty countries. Analysts see the targeting drifting away from a mostly US victim list toward Southeast Asia, South America, and Western Europe. Victims come from manufacturing, professional services, healthcare, government, and the technology sector. The targeting looks opportunistic and driven by money.
How The Gentlemen break into networks
An affiliate attack often moves from first access to encryption within two days. The group does not depend on a single new zero-day. It weaponizes known vulnerabilities and legitimate administration tools, which lets it blend into normal enterprise activity.
Initial access mostly comes through internet-facing perimeter devices, especially hardware VPNs and firewalls. Affiliates have been seen exploiting:
- Fortinet FortiGate firewalls (CVE-2024-55591)
- FortiClient EMS (CVE-2026-35616)
- SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57727)
- Cisco equipment affected by the Erlang/OTP SSH flaw (CVE-2025-32433)
Stolen, weak, or default credentials are the other route in. Affiliates often buy infostealer logs from initial access brokers, which gets them a foothold without setting off perimeter alarms.
Reconnaissance and Active Directory mapping
Once inside, affiliates map the network before they encrypt anything. They use Advanced IP Scanner and NetScan for host discovery, and the native Windows netsh utility to capture packets that may carry unencrypted credentials and other sensitive traffic.
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For Active Directory enumeration they deploy SharpADWS, which wraps LDAP queries in SOAP messages so the requests slip past standard logging. The result is a detailed picture of domain objects, high-value targets, and administrative paths, which feeds the lateral movement and privilege escalation that follow.
GentleKiller: the EDR killer framework
The most distinctive part of the operation is its defense evasion. The core operators build and maintain a proprietary framework called GentleKiller and hand it to affiliates as a standard service, so evasion does not depend on each affiliate’s skill.
GentleKiller has at least eight variants, and they abuse vulnerable or malicious drivers through the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique. The group has put the ThrottleBlood.sys driver to work terminating security processes. ESET researchers describe an “unusual ability” to operationalize newly disclosed BYOVD proofs of concept within days of publication.
The Gentlemen also use third-party and leaked EDR killers such as HexKiller and HavocKiller. Across all of these tools the same evasion approach applies: impersonating legitimate security vendors with fake version information, copied certificates, and stolen icons. Signature-based detection often fails before the encryption phase begins.
Lateral movement, exfiltration, and encryption
With defenses down, affiliates move through the domain with PsExec and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and they abuse the NETLOGON share to distribute the ransomware executable so it detonates everywhere at once. One documented technique edits Group Policy Objects (GPOs) so scheduled tasks run staged ransomware binaries from the SYSVOL/NETLOGON directories. It uses the domain’s own trust mechanisms to deliver the payload.
In Proxmox environments, affiliates have recovered plaintext administrative credentials, authenticated as root, and used VNC over WebSocket to deploy ransomware across the virtual infrastructure. Encryption there rides on legitimate administrative access, with no VM escape involved.
Data leaves the network through Rclone before encryption starts. The encryptor is a self-propagating Go binary that targets Windows, Linux, NAS, and BSD systems and locks files quickly with the ChaCha20 algorithm.
Why NVIDIA’s 2022 LAPSUS$ breach still matters
NVIDIA has been through public extortion before. In February 2022, LAPSUS$ breached the company and claimed about one terabyte of data, including employee credentials, proprietary GPU designs, driver source code, and two code-signing certificates. The certificates had expired, but Windows still accepted them for driver signing. Attackers could use them to sign malicious kernel-mode drivers that disable security software and dig in deep.
That episode showed how a data breach at NVIDIA can turn into a supply-chain trust problem. If The Gentlemen’s claim were validated, the exposure would be different but still serious: operational data, employee information, or partner credentials, which could feed later attacks or be sold to other actors. The listing itself offers no evidence of exfiltration, and the “SOON” label is a standard pressure tactic.
What NVIDIA Confidential Computing does and does not cover
NVIDIA has changed a great deal since 2022. Its Confidential Computing technology is now in its third generation on the Rubin architecture. It protects data and model weights at runtime and reaches up to 98 percent of the performance of unencrypted deployments.
That technology is built to protect data in use across cloud and third-party infrastructure. A ransomware intrusion into corporate IT systems would not by itself compromise the silicon-level security features of NVIDIA’s products. The current claim has no technical substance, so it says nothing about which of the two, if either, was touched.
How defenders can reduce exposure to The Gentlemen
The group ships affiliates a maintained, regularly updated evasion suite along with the encryptor, which lowers the skill needed for a high-impact attack. For a high-profile target, that points to a short list of controls:
- Strict identity management
- Multi-factor authentication on every remote access path
- Fast patching of edge devices
- Monitoring of driver loads for known vulnerable components
Because the group turns new BYOVD proofs of concept into working tools within days, even a fully patched network can be exposed if endpoint detection is not tuned for driver-based behavior. The usual entry points are an unpatched firewall or a set of leaked credentials, so edge patching and credential hygiene are the first things to check.
FAQ: The Gentlemen ransomware and NVIDIA
Did The Gentlemen ransomware hack NVIDIA?
Not confirmed. The group listed NVIDIA on its leak site on 18 November 2026 without sample files or a data inventory. NVIDIA has not confirmed a breach, and no independent analysis supports the claim.
What is The Gentlemen ransomware group?
The Gentlemen is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in mid-2025 and opened to affiliates in September 2025. Microsoft tracks it as Storm-2697 and Sophos as GOLD SHERWOOD. Affiliates keep 90 percent of ransom payments.
How does The Gentlemen ransomware get into networks?
Mostly through exploited internet-facing devices such as Fortinet firewalls, plus stolen or default credentials, often bought as infostealer logs from initial access brokers.
What is GentleKiller?
GentleKiller is the group’s proprietary EDR-killer framework. It has at least eight variants that use the BYOVD technique to terminate security processes before encryption.









